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Abstract: We examine why the gravity equation works and the implications for its use. There
are three contributions. First, we demonstrate that the gravity equation as a statistical
relationship (and not as a specific prediction about bilateral trade) can be generated from a model
with incomplete specialization. Second, we analyze two facts or “puzzles” that are broadly
inconsistent with the complete specialization models typically used to derive the gravity
equation. In both cases, the data are consistent with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete
specialization. “Home bias”, for example, is only puzzling when viewed through the lens of the
complete specialization model. Third, we demonstrate that the explanation for why the gravity
equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity equation is interpreted and used,
and how we view bilateral trade.
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I. Introduction
The gravity model is one of the most commonly used devices in empirical trade research.
Literally scores of studies employing gravity equations have appeared in the literature, with considerably
increased use of late. The reason for this use is summed up in leading surveys of empirical evidence on
international trade theory. Deardorff (1984) writes that gravity models are “extremely successful
empirically” judging by their ability to explain variance in bilateral trade volumes. Leamer and
Levinsohn (1997) write that gravity models “have produced some of the clearest and most robust
empirical findings in economics.”
In its most common use, the gravity model provides a baseline against which to measure
deviations from “normal” or frictionless bilateral trade. Three recent and prominent examples include
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), who measure the effects of regional trading blocs, McCallum (1995) who
measures the effect of international borders and the existence of “home bias”, and Wei (1998), who
measures the effect of exchange rate variability on trade patterns.1
The theoretical motivation for the framework is found in a set of general equilibrium models that
derive specific predictions for bilateral trade. Examples include Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985),
Deardorff (1998), and Helpman and Krugman (1985).

The common elements in each of these papers are

complete specialization and identical preferences; each good is produced in only one country and
consumers value and therefore purchase every good.
More recently, the fit of the gravity equation has been used as a test of monopolistic competition
trade theory. Harrigan (1993) estimates a unitary elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to exporter
output, as predicted by the theory. Helpman (1987) notes that the model predicts greater trade when
countries are more similar in size, and suggests that trade growth within the OECD may be caused by size
convergence over time. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) show that this property also holds for nonOECD countries with little intra-industry trade. They interpret this as evidence that the fit of the simple
gravity equation may be due to something other than trade in differentiated goods. A possible answer to
this puzzle may be found in the work of Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998).2 Both employ models
characterized by complete specialization in production and derive the gravity equation without assuming
monopolistic competition. As Grossman (1998) notes, the key to generating gravity predictions is
complete specialization itself, and not the particular details on the supply-side that give rise to it.
A consensus appears to have formed around this position – the fit of the gravity equation suggests
that production is extremely specialized, even if it does not inform us as to the source of that
1

This is a very abbreviated list of correlates; others include shipping costs, tariff rates, product standards,
information costs, exchange rate regimes, migration, political uncertainty, insecurity, and internet penetration.
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specialization. If correct, this is a powerful insight into the nature of trade, as well as a highly useful
insight for empirical work. Complete specialization models provide precise structural predictions for
bilateral trade that can be taken directly to the data. In the context of the model the baseline value for
bilateral trade is very well defined, and deviations from that baseline have direct and specific meaning in
both a positive and normative context. For example, the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to a tariff
increase maps directly into a key parameter in the underlying utility function, and the resulting quantity
change has a direct interpretation in terms of lost utility.3
The constrast with models that do not assume complete specialization is stark. The canon of
neoclassical models is generally characterized by incomplete specialization (each homogeneous good is
produced by more than one country). With more than two countries such models say little about the
pattern of bilateral trade other than predicting the set of partners with which a country may trade. The
reason for this neglect is that the bilateral pattern of trade is difficult to resolve. If there are multiple
producers of an identical good willing to sell at the same price, importers will be indifferent between them
and bilateral trade is indeterminate. In this case, there is no baseline value for bilateral trade, and no sense
in which the bilateral pattern is tied to any question of normative importance. With smallish trade barriers
importers will not be indifferent – they will purchase goods from whoever is the low cost supplier into
their market. Rough intuition thus suggests that whatever these models might have to say about bilateral
trade there is no reason to suppose it at all resembles the gravity equation.
This paper asks three questions. One, can we derive the gravity equation under incomplete rather
than complete specialization models? Two, can we find corollary evidence suggesting that incomplete
rather than complete specialization might explain the success of the gravity equation? Three, does it
matter why the gravity equation works?
After reviewing the trade volume predictions of complete specialization models in Section II, the
contribution of this paper is contained in three main sections. Section III analyzes a simple neoclassical
trade model with incomplete specialization in order to identify trade volume predictions that are similar to
or different from the complete specialization model. We provide multilateral trade volume predictions in
a general setting and use world endowment data to simulate a multi-country Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
version of the model. The model yields insights regarding the income elasticity of trade that are very
similar to the complete specialization model, but predicts a much lower level of trade. If trade is costless,
then bilateral trade is indeterminate in this model. However, trade is not costless in the world, and we
resolve the indeterminacy by letting importers chose partners in such a way as to minimize transportation

2
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See also Evenett and Keller (1998) and Jensen (2000).
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costs. This resolution yields (as a statistical relationship) bilateral trade in proportion to partner incomes,
also known as the gravity equation.
Having demonstrated where the models are similar, we turn to the question of where they are
different. We ask: if both complete and incomplete specialization models yield the gravity equation, can
we identify corollary evidence that is consistent with only one of these models? Section IV analyzes
evidence on trade in varieties and the level of trade. The complete specialization model used to derive the
gravity equation implies that consumers highly value variety, importing all goods that are produced. In
contrast, the incomplete specialization model suggests that importers will buy from only a small fraction
of available sources, strongly consistent with the data. Second, the complete specialization model
predicts trade levels much higher than incomplete specialization models, and much higher than we
observe or can explain with observable barriers. In each instance, the data suggest that the complete
specialization model used to explicitly derive the gravity equation considerably overstates either the
extent of specialization (the degree to which goods are differentiated) or the degree to which consumers
value that differentiation.
Previous authors have derived the gravity equation under a variety of assumptions, so simply
adding another model to the list is of limited consequence. A case must be made that the explanation for
why the gravity equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity equation is interpreted and
used, and how we view bilateral trade. In Section V, we examine the positive interpretation and
normative content of gravity regressions under complete and incomplete specialization. Section VI
concludes.

II. The Null Hypothesis: Complete Specialization
We begin by examining predictions about the volume of trade in what we term complete
specialization (CS) models. These models have at their core two common assumptions: production is
completely specialized (only one exporter produces each good), and importers purchase all goods. The
familiar monopolistic competition framework with CES utility is one such model, though its virtue is that
complete specialization is derived rather than assumed.4
To show the central role these assumptions play, we provide the following simple model that is
closely related to Anderson (1979). We assume all goods are final goods, that trade is balanced, and there
is no international lending. With identical and homothetic preferences, and assuming no trade barriers,
each country i will consume an income share, b k , of good k, or
4

With the CES utility structure, consumers demand all varieties and producers always produce unique varieties in
order to have monopoly power over that variety.
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Cik = b kYi

(1)

World output of good k, X wk , must equal world consumption, so summing purchases of good k over all
countries, X wk = b k

å

Y . Solving for b k and substituting into equation (1) we find that i consumes its

l l

world income share ( si = Yi / Yw ) of world production of good k.

Cik = si X wk

(2)

By assumption, production is completely specialized. That is, every country is the sole supplier of the
goods that it produces, or X wk = X kj . As a result, the consumption vector directly pins down the pattern
of bilateral imports of good k as

M ijk = si X wk = si X kj

(3)

Country i will demand a similar fraction of all the goods produced in country j. Summing over all
sectors, and noting that the sum of sectoral output equals national income in j, we arrive at a prediction
for bilateral trade:

M ij = å k siY jk =

(4)

YY
i j
Yw

This equation is known as the simple or frictionless gravity model.
Complete specialization models also provide straightforward predictions about the multilateral
volume of trade. Sum equation (4) over all partner countries for a particular importer,

M i = Yi (1 - si )

(5)

This multilateral model provides a baseline prediction for the level of trade, and an implication that the
trade share of income (M/Y) is decreasing in income.
For several exercises, we wish to evaluate the predictions of the model in the presence of trade
barriers. This requires a specific form of the model and a specific assumption about utility. We employ
the most common form of the complete specialization framework, a one-sector model in which firms are
monopolistically competitive and produce differentiated varieties that enter a CES utility function as
follows.

Ui =

(å

j

( ))
cij

q 1/ q

where Cij denotes consumption in importer i of a variety j, q = 1 - 1/ s , and σ is the elasticity of
substitution between goods. An important benefit of this model is that it provides a flexible way to
evaluate implied trade barriers over a range of substitutability between goods.

5

As the trade volume predictions in this model are well known, we do not repeat the derivation
here. Country i's purchases from a source j are given by
(6)

( p j tij ) - s
M ij = YY
i j
Pi

where Yj is output from exporter j, tij ³ 1 is the ad-valorem trade barrier, p j tij is the price of the good
inclusive of all transactions costs, and Pi is a CES price index over all available goods.
This model contains four predictions that we wish to highlight and then compare to an alternative
hypothesis of incomplete specialization. The first two predictions concern the income elasticity of trade.
One, the gravity equation captured in equations (4) and (6) predicts a unitary elasticity of bilateral trade
with respect to the product of partner incomes. Two, equation (5) predicts that the elasticity of multilateral
trade with respect to income is less than one -- that small countries trade a larger fraction of income than
do large countries.
The third prediction concerns the level of trade. Absent trade costs, equation (5) predicts
multilateral trade equal to 90 percent of income for a country with 10 percent of world GDP. With trade
barriers, equation (6), trade may be considerably lower depending on the size of the barrier and the
elasticity of substitution. The fourth prediction concerns which countries trade. Equation (3) indicates
that if a country produces a good, all other countries purchase it. Note that this is true even in the
presence of (finite) iceberg transport costs.5

III. The Alternative Hypothesis: Incomplete Specialization
The models used to derive the gravity equation as a specific and determinate prediction for
bilateral trade have at their core the assumption of complete specialization – each good is produced in
only one country. In this section we examine a model with incomplete specialization (multiple countries
may produce each homogeneous good). This is not an esoteric choice of models to examine – the
canonical models of neoclassical trade theory including Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardian, and Specific Factors
models commonly exhibit incomplete specialization.
Our goal is to examine the income elasticity of trade, the level of trade, and the number of
partners from which a country imports a particular good using the most general possible setting. In some
cases we will require a more specific formulation to make specific predictions and here we employ a
simple 2 good, 2 factor, N country Heckscher-Ohlin world to illustrate model properties. The point here

5

Equation (6) implies that, with finite trade barriers and finite substitution elasticity, all varieties are purchased.
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is not to set up a horse race, but rather to illuminate which predictions are unique to complete or to
incomplete specialization and which predictions are shared.

III.1 Multilateral Trade
We begin by using a simple accounting exercise to derive the multilateral volume of trade in the
presence of incomplete specialization. As above we assume away intermediate goods, and note that
national output X and national income Y must be equal. Define gkj as the output share of good k in
country j, so that country j's output of good k is

X kj = gkj X j = gkj Y j .
As in the previous model, identical and homothetic preferences ensure that every country consumes its
world income share of each consumption good.

C kj = s j X wk
An accounting identity expresses the volume of exports in a sector as production less consumption, or

X wk
EX = gY j - s j X = Y j (g ) = Y j (gkj - b k )
Xw
k
j

k
j

k
w

k
j

where bk is the share of good k in world consumption (production). Summing over those sectors with
positive exports ( k ∈ EXP ) gives the total volume of exports.

(7)

EX j = Y j

å

k Îexp

(gkj - b k )

The volume of exports depends on the income of the country and the trade share of income (the
summation term). The trade share of income can also be thought of as a measure of the extent of
specialization - the difference between what a country produces and the average of world production.
For example, assume goods production is completely specialized (one exporter per good) as in
the previous section. First rewrite equation (7) as
(8)

X j = Y j (1 - s j ) å (gkj - grk )
k Îexp

where subscript r denotes rest-of-world. Since each country is the sole supplier of its export good,

grk = 0 , and since all goods produced in j are exported,

å

k Îexp

(gkj ) = 1 . This simplifies to yield the

predicted trade level from the complete specialization model, equation (5). It also makes clear that trade

7

levels are maximized under complete specialization.6 In the more general case of incomplete
k
specialization (when γ
r ≠ 0 in (8)), we expect much lower trade volumes. This is the first major result

of this section: observed trade levels look low relative to a model that predicts the maximum possible
volume of trade.
Equation (7) also provides insights into the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income.
Suppose that in a cross-country sample the extent of specialization is uncorrelated with incomes.

cov{Y j , ( å (gkj - b k ))} = 0
k Îexp

That is, output shares do not differ from world production averages to a greater degree in large countries.
In this case, the measured elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income is one. This is true
regardless of the details of why countries specialize. In a statistical sense, the supply-side details of the
model are a disturbance around an accounting baseline. This baseline says simply: other things equal,
large countries trade more.

III.2 The Textbook Case: 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin
Since (7) was derived using only an accounting identity and a common assumption on
preferences it is independent of issues such as the number of goods, factors, or countries, whether
production is characterized by increasing or constant returns to scale, or whether cross-country
heterogeneity is due to factor endowments, technology, or goods differentiation. However, since it is only
an accounting identity it has limited economic content. Next we examine equation (7) in the context of a
familiar model.
We employ the textbook 2 goods, 2 factors Heckscher-Ohlin model, which we analyze in a many
country context. In this model, the level of trade and the elasticity of trade with respect to income depend
on the distribution of the capital-labor ratio (k). Larger endowment differences (i.e., increasing

kdifi = ki - k w ) yield greater specialization in country i and more trade.7 The estimated elasticity of
trade with respect to income depends on the sample covariance of kdif and Y. If large and small countries
have endowments that are equally far from the world endowment, then the extent of specialization given
by endowments is uncorrelated with incomes. In this case, the elasticity of trade with respect to income is
one. However, if large countries have endowments ki = k w and only small countries differ from the
world endowment, in our cross-country sample we will observe that trade is decreasing in incomes.
6

Of course, one can specify preferences to exceed trade volumes predicted by a model of complete specialization
and identical homothetic preferences. In the limiting case, country A produces only good 1, and consumes only
good 2. Country B produces only good 2, and consumes only good 1, yielding trade/GDP =1.
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In short, the HO model contains no theoretical presumptions for the extent of specialization, the
level of trade, or the income elasticity of trade that are independent of the country distribution of k and Y.
A sensible exercise in this case is to check world endowments and examine predictions about trade given
the observed distributions. We assume taste and technology parameters, and using data on k and Y, we
generate predicted values for trade in a 2x2xN country HO model. Details on the model solution are
provided in an appendix, and summarized here.
Preferences are Cobb-Douglas with equal expenditure shares on both goods. We employ the
standard assumption of infinitesimal trade barriers operating at the border. This ensures that countries will
first satisfy domestic consumption demands with domestic production before turning to foreign sources of
supply. Production is Cobb-Douglas for the two goods.

Z1 = K a L1- a

Z 2 = K 1- a La

We experiment with the parameters, varying α from 0.55 to 0.95. Data on k and Y come from World
Bank sources and cover 96 countries in 1990. As there are large differences across countries in the
fraction of output devoted to traded goods, we employ non-service sector GDP in place of total GDP.8
The numerical model solves for the output of both goods in each country, and the vectors of multilateral
imports and exports. Bilateral patterns are left to the following section.
The numerical model generates trade levels between 20 and 40 percent of output.9 This is in the
range of trade shares observed for most countries. The exercise provides a useful illustration that trade
levels resembling actual data can be generated by the most common textbook model with no trade
barriers. Section IV draws a contrast between this result and the size of trade barriers necessary to
reconcile complete specialization models with actual trade levels.
Next we estimate the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income generated by the
numerical HO model, both with and without endowment data as a control.

(9)

ln M i = a + β1 ln Yi + εij

(10)

ln M i = a + β1 ln Yi + β2 kldifi + εij

7

However, once all countries are outside of the diversification cone and producing only their export goods,
increasing factor dissimilarity does not affect specialization or trade volumes.
8
This requires the following additional assumptions. One, the income share spent on services is exogenous. Two,
factor usage in the service sector is identical to the national K/L ratio in each country. While these are strong
assumptions, the results we present are very similar when using total GDP in the numerical model.
9
Trade levels vary inversely with α. Small values of α imply that countries heavily specialize in their export good
and export more.
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In Table 1, we report estimates using data from the α = .75 case.10 For contrast, we also report estimates
employing actual multilateral trade data from the Statistics Canada World Trade Database.
Cross-section estimates on the HO model, omitting endowments, show elasticities close to, but
slightly less than, one. Thus, the numerical HO model provides the same insight as the complete
specialization model – while the level of trade is greater in large countries, small countries trade a larger
share of income. In the HO model this is explained by the actual distribution of k and Y. Endowments of
small countries deviate from the world endowment to a slightly greater extent than large countries. As a
consequence, small countries are more extensively specialized, but the effect is not so important that their
level of trade is greater. Note that, as equation (7) predicts, when we include the endowment data in the
regression we cannot reject a unitary income elasticity.

III.3 Bilateral Trade and the Gravity Model
Neoclassical models with incomplete specialization and more than two countries say little about
bilateral trade, other than predicting the set of partners with which a country may trade. The first reason
for this neglect is that the bilateral pattern of trade is difficult to resolve. If there are multiple producers
of an identical good willing to sell at the same price, importers will be indifferent between them and
bilateral trade is indeterminate. This is the second reason for the neglect of bilateral patterns – if
importers are truly indifferent to partner selection, researchers should be indifferent as well. That is to
say, if bilateral volumes resist positive description and their resolution is a matter of no consequence from
a normative standpoint, why bother?
However, pure indeterminacy is a problem more relevant to theoretical exercises than to
empirical applications. Even with multiple suppliers of homogeneous goods, in the real world trade will
not be literally indeterminate, as variation in trade costs will quickly sort out bilateral pairings. To
address this more empirically relevant case, we experiment with a model in which trade costs resolve the
bilateral trade pattern.11 We examine whether the trade patterns that arise from this model mimic the
gravity equation, in the sense that bilateral trade is proportional to the product of partner incomes.
Suppose trade barriers are rising in distance so that importers of homogeneous goods buy only
from the closest, and therefore cheapest, source of supply. This resolves the indeterminacy, but at the cost
of an exceptionally complicated equilibrium (location-specific prices for each good). To avoid this
problem, we allow bilateral trade costs to become arbitrarily small while retaining the cost ranking of
partners. Then equilibrium prices are unaffected, but bilateral indeterminacy is resolved. This is
fundamentally the same method used in neoclassical models to resolve indeterminacy between home and
10
11

Results are qualitatively similar for other parameter values.
We thank Jim Harrigan and Don Davis for this suggestion.
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foreign sources of supply. Rather than assuming an arbitrarily small barrier operating at national borders,
we assume an arbitrarily small bilateral barrier that is rising in distance.
Of course, this model provides an immediate departure from an important prediction of the
complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation. Importers do not value multiple
sources of homogeneous goods, and so will not buy goods from every available supplier. Instead,
importers shift purchases to the low-cost supplier(s).12
This model differs substantially from an earlier examination of bilateral trade under incomplete
specialization. Deardorff (1998) analyzes a model in which trade is frictionless and all producers sell at
the same price.13 To resolve indeterminancy, Deardorff employs a particular probability model. Let all
production be placed into a common world pool from which bilateral trade is allocated, one dollar at a
time. To allocate this trade unit we randomly select an exporter and an importer, with selection
probabilities given by their shares of the world pool, i.e., exporter j and importer i are chosen with
probabilities Pj = Y j / Yw and Pi = Yi / Yw so that the expected probability of an ij match for any one
draw is given by Pij = YiY j / Yw2 . With Yw draws, the expected number of times a particular pair is chosen
(and the volume of trade) is the simple, or frictionless gravity equation. E ( M ij ) = YiY j / Yw
This is an interesting theoretical point but the approach has limited application. First, it is
equivalent to showing the gravity equation holds by assuming the gravity equation holds – the resolution
is not unique, and different random matching models generate different outcomes that are equally
“likely”. Indeed, given indeterminacy any resolution of bilateral trade is acceptable so long as adding up
constraints are met. Second, the model is extremely sensitive to the inclusion of trade barriers – even
infinitesimally small barriers invalidate the prediction. As such it is uniquely unqualified to motivate the
use of the gravity equation for measuring trade barriers, and after all, this is one of the principle uses to
which gravity equations are put. Finally, we note that the Deardorff model predictions regarding the level
of trade and numbers of exporters from whom an exporter buys are identical to the complete
specialization model without barriers. We show in the next section that the data strongly reject these
predictions.
To complete the analysis, we employ the 2x2xN numerical HO model from the previous section
with data on k and Y drawn from world endowments. The model generates vectors of output and
multilateral trade for each country, and determines the set of partners with which a country may trade.
12

There will not necessarily be a single low cost supplier. Limao and Venables (1999) develop an analytical model
with the properties of our current setup. Importers buy from multiple sellers, all of whom sell at the same (cif) price,
but they do not buy from all available sellers.
13
Evenett and Keller (1998) also examine incomplete specialization, but restrict themselves to a two-country case.
As a result, bilateral trade is identical to multilateral trade and is therefore well determined in the model.
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We then resolve indeterminacy in bilateral trade using the “minimum distance” rule. This yields a
bilateral trade matrix for the numerical HO model that can be compared both to real bilateral data and to
the prediction of the complete specialization model.
We estimate the simple gravity equation in cross-section using data generated from the numerical
HO model and real bilateral trade data. For the HO model data we also include the variable kldif for both
the importer and exporter. When examining real data, equation (6) implies that trade barriers influence
trade volumes, and their omission may affect the estimated elasticity. To address this problem, we follow
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) in estimating the relationship in a panel with yearly data from 1970-1992
and including country pair fixed effects and year dummies.14 This sweeps out time-invariant, pairspecific trade barriers, as well as pair-invariant, time specific trade barriers. This is our preferred
specification as it controls for a long list of plausibly important omitted variables, enabling a cleaner
examination of the income elasticity. The three estimating equations are:

(11)

ln M ij = a + β1 ln YY
i j + εij

(12)

ln M ij = a + β1 ln YY
2 kldifi + β
3kldif j + εij
i j + β

(13)

ln M ijt = a + β1 ln YitY jt + cij + yrt + eij
We report the results in Table 2. A strict test that β=
1 can be rejected in all regressions,
1

including those employing real data, but a looser null that β>
0 cannot be rejected. Note that the
1
coefficients generated from the HO model are not significantly different from those estimated using panel
techniques on real data.
In our HO model two things resolve the bilateral pattern of trade. Relative endowments
determine the set of partners with which a country may trade, and relative distance determines which of
that set will be chosen. Partner income plays no role in the theoretical model. Why then do partner
incomes enter significantly in the empirical model?
The simple intuition is that the bilateral trade matrix is governed by a set of adding up constraints.
When summing country i's imports over all sources, one must get back i’s multilateral volume of imports,
and similarly for country j's exports. For any particular importer, the trade pattern may be unrelated to the
.
14

These results are very similar when using either five year or ten-year intervals instead of annual data, and results
are very similar when we exclude year dummies altogether.
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size of exporters’shipments. But some country must buy the goods of large exporters. On average,
bilateral shipments involving countries that export a great deal must exceed the bilateral shipments
involving countries that export very little.
The evidence in Table 1 then allows us to connect this intuition back to partner incomes, as
opposed to multilateral trade volumes. There we showed that the HO model (given world data on k and
Y) predicts a tight relationship between country size and the level of trade. This suggests that incomes
operate as a good proxy for the multilateral import and export terms. That is, incomes predict multilateral
trade, and multilateral trade is related to bilateral trade mechanically through adding up constraints. In this
sense the model generates a statistical or “on-average” relationship between bilateral trade and incomes.
This is very different from a model prediction linking the two variables, as we detail in Section V.
A few notes on robustness are in order. First, we have not proven that every allocation of
bilateral trade must look like the gravity equation.15 However, we have experimented with using many
different barrier types (tariffs, NTB’s, shipping costs) to resolve bilateral indeterminacy in the manner of
the “minimum distance” rule used above, and all deliver quite similar results. Second, our argument
clearly turns on the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income. Under the HO model version of
our alternative hypothesis this elasticity depends in turn on the distribution of endowments and incomes.
As a result it is easy to generate examples in which multilateral trade (and therefore bilateral trade) is
unrelated to, or negatively related to, incomes. Thus it is not true that, as Deardorff (1998) conjectures,
“almost any model” will fit the gravity equation. It just happens that endowments and income in the
world are distributed in such a way that the HO model does generate the gravity relationship.
It should be emphasized that we have focused entirely on patterns that are revealed through
bilateral trade volume regressions. This ignores which countries a nation trades with and how the models
stack up in that regard.

It is well known that 2x2 HO models cannot explain north-north trade, though

recent work by Davis (1997) shows that higher dimensional models can. Our argument goes through for
higher dimensions so long as the extent of specialization is not strongly negatively correlated with
incomes. In this case we would match the determinants and level of trade volumes, while also resolving
the north-north problem.16

15

In previous drafts we have experimented with a wide variety of rules for randomly determining the bilateral trade
pattern under indeterminacy and all yield something like the Table 2 results. This is clearly not a proof that every
allocation under indeterminacy will work. However, since trade costs undoubtedly resolve indeterminacy in the real
world, worrying about possible outcomes under indeterminacy seems a sterile pursuit.
16
We have not attempted this calibration because we lack data on the finely differentiated factor supplies that
motivate Davis' argument for higher dimensions.
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IV. Corollary Evidence
The previous sections suggest that the income elasticities of multilateral and bilateral trade look
quite similar when derived from models with complete specialization and those with incomplete
specialization. In this section we examine model predictions that are dissimilar. These two predictions
concern “corners” or zero values in the bilateral trade matrix, and the overall level of trade. The complete
specialization models used to derive the gravity regression have very particular predictions that differ
substantially from the incomplete specialization model we have described. We do not intend this look at
the data as a “test” of one model over another, but rather a broad check of the consistency of the complete
specialization explanation for gravity regressions. We show that data patterns that appear as “puzzles” to
be explained in the context of complete specialization models may not be puzzles at all if the world is
incompletely specialized.

III.1 Zero Values in the Bilateral Trade Matrix
Can we find direct evidence in trade data that production is completely specialized (only one
country produces each good)? One possibility is that goods production is completely specialized at the
precise level of aggregation at which we chose to examine trade data. In this case, we should see only
one producer for each product code. A second possibility is that goods production is completely
specialized at much more disaggregated levels than we are able to measure. (This includes “varieties” of
goods, as in the monopolistic competition model.) In this case, we might observe many producers within
a single product code. Aggregation issues thus preclude a direct investigation as to whether production is
completely specialized.
However, by restricting our attention to the complete specialization models used to derive the
gravity equation, a fundamental implication is observable. These models assume that production is
completely specialized and that all products (varieties) are valued and purchased by all consumers.17 We
examine the equation (3) implication that if a country exports a good to at least one country, it will export
that good to all countries.18
Figure 1 provides evidence on this point. We define a “good” as a 4-digit SITC category. Using
1990 bilateral trade data from the Statistics Canada World Trade Database (WTDB) we calculate the
number of exporters in each good, with the count frequency displayed at the top of Figure 1. The median

17

We acknowledge the contribution of referees who have pointed out that this implication is not a perfectly general
implication of all complete specialization models with identical preferences. This is addressed below.
18
Previous authors have noted the existence of zero values in the trade matrix, but this is generally acknowledged in
the context of motivating proper econometric technique to handle zero values. We are unaware of work that uses
the existence of zero values as evidence on the nature of specialization.
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number of suppliers in each category is 81. For each importer and good we calculate the number of
exporters from whom the importer purchases that good. We then express this as a ratio over the total
number of exporters in that good. If an importer does not purchase a good from any exporter, the ratio is
zero. Complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation predict that the ratio should be
one for all goods and countries. Using four-digit SITC level we have 173 countries and 438 4-digit
sectors, for 75774 total data points.
The message of Figure 1 is clear. Countries do not buy all available goods, as zero values (no
imports from any source of that good) represent fully 27 percent of the distribution. Conditional on
importing the good from at least one exporter, countries buy from very few exporters. In 58 percent of
these cases, importers buy from fewer than 10 percent of available exporters, and in 99.4 percent of the
cases fewer than half of the available varieties purchased. Considering only rich (OECD) countries or
only manufactured goods, the ratio increases but the distribution remains bunched much closer to zero
than to one.19 This data pattern is not unique to this year or this dataset. A very similar pattern can be
found in the World Trade Database for every year from 1970-1997. UN COMTRADE data from 19621983 evaluated at the 4 and 5 digit SITC level exhibits the same pattern but to an even greater degree – in
eighty percent of observations importers buy from fewer than 10 percent of available suppliers.
Of course, the model captured in equation (3) may not apply to all goods or all countries. It is
therefore unsurprising to find some values less than one. The surprising thing is that in none of the 75,774
cases does an importer avail itself of all varieties. While the median number of suppliers in a good is 81,
the modal value for number of partners with which a country trades a particular good is zero; conditional
on buying from someone, the modal value is one.
This rejection is made more striking by the fact that our data examination is biased in favor of
complete specialization models used to generate the gravity equation. Strictly speaking, equation (3)
implies that if a country produces a good, all other countries import it. These data cannot identify cases
in which countries produce (but fail to export) certain goods.20

Also, we cannot identify the full breadth

of varieties available from an exporter. There are many car models produced in the US, but we can only
determine if at least one model is purchased. While we have no direct evidence on the full set of varieties
produced, we suspect that the fraction of available varieties that are actually imported is even lower than
the figure suggests.21
19

Over the whole sample, importers buy from a median of 4 percent of exporters; for the OECD importers only it is
25 percent; for manufactures over all importers, 7.4 percent; for manufactured imports into the OECD, 29 percent.
20
This would require a comprehensive and detailed set of production data and existing sources, such as the OECD
COMTAP or STAN databases, are too aggregated and too limited in geographic scope to be of use.
21
This conjecture is supported by calculations performed at the one-, two-, and three-digit level. Higher levels of
aggregation pull the distribution further to the right, though even for very broad categories it is clear that importers
buy only a fraction of available varieties.
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What models would deliver Figure 1? In the most common formulation of the section II model,
preferences are CES over varieties of goods, and monopolistically competitive firms produce unique,
differentiated, varieties in order to charge markups. Introducing non-infinite iceberg transport costs to this
model will diminish trade, but never force it to zero.22
To generate the data pattern in the figure requires a model in which importers do not consume
every variety. Consider several examples. First, if there are multiple producers of a good that consumers
regard as homogeneous, they will buy only from the low cost exporter. Thus, our alternative hypothesis
of incomplete specialization can be used to reconcile a decidedly inconvenient fact from the complete
specialization framework used to derive gravity equations.
Figure 1 can be reconciled with a complete specialization model coupled with some reason that
consumers value and purchase only a subset of available varieties. For example, with preferences as in
Lancaster (1979), importers only value and therefore will purchase a small number of “ideal” varieties.
Even if the utility function exhibits some “love of variety”, the presence of fixed costs of trade (see
Romer (1994) and Klenow and Rodriguez (1998) for two examples) or declining marginal utility of
varieties (see Ottaviano, et al. (1999)) will cause importers to buy only a handful of varieties.
Clearly then, we cannot reject these other hypotheses as explanations for the Figure 1 result, and
indeed they seem like sensible directions to pursue.23 However, their implications for trade volumes and
for the pattern of bilateral trade differ markedly from the simple world captured in the Section II model.
For example, in a model with fixed costs of trade, larger countries are willing to pay the fixed costs for a
greater set of varieties and therefore trade more as a fraction of income than do small countries. This
exactly reverses the implication of equation (5). And with zeros, the bilateral pattern of trade becomes
very difficult to resolve, and in in many cases indeterminate. Absent some heterogeneity, the model
implies that importers buy a subset of available varieties, but not which varieties.24 Put another way,
while it may be possible to reconcile Figure 1 with a modified “love of variety” preference formulation, it
is much more difficult to reconcile the zero values with the model used to generate the gravity equation.

III.2 The Level of Trade
Beginning with McCallum (1995), a number of authors have used gravity regressions to reveal a
significant puzzle in international economics regarding the level of trade. The key idea is to estimate (6)
22

One could argue that finite costs might diminish trade to the point that is observably zero, that is, below levels
captured by trade statistics. If so, the zeros should be predictable in the sense that estimating the model with OLS on
positive values should predict trade values extremely close to zero for all observed zeros. We have experimented
with this and found that, for most observed zeros, the model predicts positive values of trade greater than the
threshhold value at which trade statistics are reported.
23
We regard an investigation into partner selection, largely ignored to this point, as a promising method for learning
about the nature of differentiation and trade barriers. See Haveman, et al. (1999) for an example.

16

treating domestic purchases as one of many bilateral “trade” options, and to include a dummy variable to
indicate domestic purchases. These studies find large border effects – domestic purchases are many times
larger than foreign purchases. The implication usually drawn is that international borders appear
remarkably closed to trade. We argue here that trade levels are only puzzlingly low when evaluated in the
context of a particular model of complete specialization. We briefly compare these model predictions to
the data, and then turn to incomplete specialization as an alternative hypothesis for the “puzzle”.
Equations (4) and (6) provide predictions for the level of trade with and without trade barriers.
We provide calculations showing how large barriers must be in order for the model with trade barriers to
generate actual trade levels.25 Suppose that the price of imported goods inclusive of ad-valorem barriers
is constant over all external sources.26 Using equation (6), we can then express the ratio of internal over
external purchases (all imports, r) as
s

(14)

M ii
s æp t ö
= i ç r ir ÷
M ir 1 - si è pitii ø

S º si /(1 - si ) is the predicted value of internal to external purchases provided that internal and external
prices are equal. We observe S and M º M ii / M ir . Given values for σ, we can solve for the ratio of
internal to external transactions costs implied by purchases. We provide calculations using aggregate
trade data and use non-service sector gross output to construct the income share terms, si .27 Multilateral
imports are constructed from the WTDB. Internal purchases are non-service sector gross output less
multilateral exports.
The first column of Table 3 reports M, the observed ratio of internal to external purchases, for 19
countries. The second column reports S, the predicted value of internal to external purchases under the
assumption that internal and external prices are equal. The third column is M/S, and shows that the
observed ratio of internal to external purchases is anywhere from 13 to 2000 times larger than what is
predicted under the equal transactions cost case.
24

See Klenow and Rodriguez (1998).
We eschew the typical approach of estimating a gravity regression with border dummies for several reasons. One,
the model implies particular elasticities for the income terms and we impose rather than estimate these elasticities.
Two, estimation runs into a host of measurement problems that we avoid. For example, differences in measures of
internal distance (how far is a country from itself?), the treatment of proxy variables like language and adjacency,
and the manner in which the CES price index is handled all seem to dramatically affect estimates.
26
This approach assumes there is little bilateral variation in transactions costs over external sources. This is
precisely what gravity model-based studies imply. Border effects are many times larger than effects associated with
exporter-varying barriers such as distance, language, or adjacency.
27
To get non-service sector gross output, we use World Bank data to construct non-service sector GDP, then
multiply by the gross output to value-added ratios found in Wei (1996). The difference between value added and
gross-output is not a problem in the construction of income shares so long as the the ratio is similar for the importer
and the world.
25
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Several authors (Wei, 1996; Evans 1999) have noted that, in the context of this model, trade
levels may be low because transactions costs are high or because the elasticity of substitution is high. In
short, if σ is a free parameter it can be chosen to match any trade level given any transactions cost. How
then can we use the level of trade to generate any inferences about the validity of the complete
specialization model? Simply, σ is not a free parameter and can be identified by how bilateral import
quantities respond to relative price variation.
Two recent papers that assume a complete specialization framework (in particular, monopolistic
competition) and use aggregate bilateral trade data provide helpful estimates. Hummels (1999) uses the
coefficient on the distance term from an aggregate gravity regression along with the technological
relationship between freight and distance to identify σ and finds elasticities in the range of 2.2 to 4.6.
Baier and Bergstrand (1999) relate time series variation in aggregate freight and tariff barriers to trade
growth in a gravity framework and identify σ =6.28 Based on these estimates we use a value of σ =5 to
interpret the trade data.
The third column of Table 3 can also be interpreted as the ratio of external to internal prices
implied by trade flows in the σ=1 case. Exponentiating values in this column by (1/ σ) yields the price
ratio for higher substitution elasticities. The US is, according to this model, the most open to trade.
External transactions costs raise the price of imported goods by only (!) 68 percent relative to domestic
goods. Elsewhere, imported goods are from 2 to 4 times more expensive than domestic goods. A
comparison to measurable trade barriers is useful here. US import data for 1994 indicate that aggregate
expenditures on tariffs and transportation costs for imported goods are approximately 6 percent advalorem.
What conclusion do we draw from this exercise? Given evidence on the elasticity of
substitution, complete specialization models predict extremely high trade levels. When filtering evidence
on actual trade levels through these models, one must conclude that national borders are extremely costly
barriers to surmount. While introspection and the size of measurable barriers suggest this interpretation is
in error, we cannot formally reject it without knowing precisely what trade costs borders pose. Perhaps
some enormous yet difficult to measure barrier looms at national borders.
Another interpretation is that borders pose a moderate barrier to trade and that complete
specialization models dramatically over-predict trade volumes. The home bias literature assumes that the
frictionless gravity equation (4) accurately predicts the trade volume that would prevail were barriers nonexistent. And as the previous section shows, that model provides the limiting case for maximal trade
flows given identical preferences. Models with incomplete specialization predict much lower trade

28

Estimates on sector level data yield higher elasticity estimates, on the order of 7 to 8. See Hummels (1999).
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volumes, and our 2x2 HO model employing world data on endowments and incomes generates trade
volumes that are on the order of those observed in the world.29 In that model domestic demands are first
met by domestic supplies when both home and foreign producers manufacture the same good. This can
be justified by very small border costs.

V. Implications: Does it Matter Why the Gravity Equation Works?
Previous authors have shown that the gravity equation can be derived from any number of
underlying models, so simply adding another model to the list is of limited consequence. A case must be
made that the explanation for why the gravity equation works has some relevance for how the gravity
equation is interpreted and used, and how we view bilateral trade.
The most immediate implication is seen in the previous section. Viewed through the lens of
complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation, both the level of trade and the
existence of zeros in the bilateral trade matrix are significant puzzles. Much ink has been spilt trying to
understand why home bias appears to so strongly characterize trade flows. Under the alternative
hypothesis, there is no puzzle.

V.1 Normative Implications of Bilateral Trade
The normative consequences of deviations from the gravity equation prediction for trade differ
considerably under the complete and incomplete specialization models. Under complete specialization,
the gravity equation is not merely a positive description of bilateral trade; it has normative content as
well. Consider the most common version of the model that proceeds from CES preferences and is
captured in equation (6). It is a straightforward exercise to evaluate the utility function using observed
trade quantities. In this model deviations in bilateral trade from the predicted baseline result in direct and
quantifiable welfare losses.30
The normative implications under incomplete specialization are quite different. As we argue in
the previous section, indeterminacy may result from a world of costless trade precisely because importers
are indifferent to multiple sources of supply. However this trade is arranged, whether it looks country
pair by country pair exactly like the frictionless gravity equation as Deardorff suggests it may, or whether
it deviates wildly from this benchmark, it simply does not affect welfare. In the case where
indeterminacy is resolved via trade barriers, Table 2 indicates that something like the gravity equation
appears to hold as a kind of “on-average” statistical relationship. Yet many country pairs will exhibit
29
30

Another possibility is that fixed costs of trade prevent some firms from exporting. See Evans (2000).
See Lai and Trefler (1999).
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trade looking nothing at all like equation (6), and many of these values will be zero, a prediction
confirmed for the real world by the data in Figure 1. Still, bilateral deviations that leave net supplies and
terms of trade unchanged are of no normative consequence because under the alternative hypothesis,
importers do not attach any value to multiple sources of supply. They care only for purchasing the goods
from the low cost supplier.
A particular example of this logic can be seen in the debate over regional trade agreements.
Krugman (1991) models the welfare gains from regional versus multilateral integration in a monopolistic
competition framework, and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) implement the model empirically using a
gravity regression. One basic insight is that regional agreements can be costly relative to multilateral
liberalization because consumers value distinct varieties produced outside the bloc. Indeed, as Deardorff
and Stern (1994) note, trade diversion must exist in this model because all outside varieties are distinct
and valued. They show that the welfare consequences are very different in a neoclassical model in which
the goods produced inside the bloc are identical to those produced outside the bloc. Here regional
integration may not be costly precisely because there is no value to purchasing the homogeneous good
from multiple sources.

V.2 Evidence on the Nature and Extent of Specialization
Several authors have examined the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to partner incomes
hoping to generate inferences regarding the nature of specialization. Our findings on incomplete
specialization provide some insight into this literature.
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) find that a variant of the gravity model works well even for nonOECD countries whose trade does not appear well described by monopolistic competition. One response
is to suggest, in the vein of Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998), that these countries trade goods whose
production is completely specialized (though this inference is problematic given the importance of
commonly produced bulk commodities in the trade of the non-OECD countries that Hummels and
Levinsohn examine). An alternative response inspired by Table 2 is that it matters little whether these
countries trade completely or incompletely specialized goods. Something like the gravity equation would
have worked in any case.
DeBaere (1999) suggests that the broad success of the gravity equation, and a resolution of the
Hummels and Levinsohn puzzle can be found in the particular specification employed. Denoting the sum
of partner’s income as ( Yij = Yi + Y j ), we can rewrite the simple gravity equation as

M ij = (Yij )[1 − (Yi / Yij ) 2 − (Y j / Yij )2 ] .
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The income sum is a scaling term and the term in the square bracket is a measure of size dispersion that
takes on maximal value when the countries are of equal size. DeBaere claims (but does not derive
formally) that bilateral trade volumes will be correlated with the scaling term in any trade model whereas
the size dispersion term will affect bilateral trade only under complete specialization (monopolistic
competition).31
Employing DeBaere’s formulation and using the data from the HO numerical model in which
bilateral trade is resolved with the minimum distance rule, we estimate

ln( M ij / Yij ) = − 6.87 + 7.8 ⋅ln(1 − (Yi / Yij )2 − (Y j / Yij ) 2 ) + εij
R 2 = .49
With a t-stat of 14, we find that size dispersion remains an important determinant of bilateral trade even
under the HO model, thereby rejecting DeBaere’s inference.
Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1999) estimate a gravity relationship on disaggregated trade data
as a test of a reciprocal dumping model. They find income coefficients significantly less than one for
estimates involving reference priced commodity groups, and take this as evidence for the dumping model.
An alternative explanation for these results is that the reference priced commodities are best described by
the HO model (that is, homogeneous goods produced under perfect competition). Our results suggest
income coefficients for trade involving these goods will be positive, but less than one.
Finally, our results provide some insights into the extent of specialization, in that gravity
equations cannot be regarded as arising only from complete specialization and that corollary evidence
(zeros, trade levels) is highly problematic for complete specialization models. We liken the insights to
research provided by Don Davis (1995, 1997) into the existence of intra-industry trade, and the large
volume of bilateral trade between similar countries. A narrow reading indicates that both facts are
inconsistent with the simplest neoclassical models, and suggests the need for models (such as
monopolistic competition) that can explain these facts. However, Davis shows that extensions of
neoclassical models can explain both intra-industry and north-north trade. The point is not that simple
neoclassical models are wrong, or that new trade theory models are unnecessary. Instead, the exercise
helps us to identify which features of models are important for explaining trade patterns.
In this vein, we recognize that models with complete specialization are a critical component of
our empirical and theoretical toolkits. Yet, our facts on trade levels and variety trade indicate something
31

Hummels and Levinsohn estimate this equation as a product of these two terms, whereas Debaere moves the
scaling term to the left hand side. His result is that size dispersion is significant for trade within OECD countries but
not for trade outside the OECD.
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is amiss with these models. In each case the data suggest that the complete specialization model
considerably overstates either the extent of specialization (the degree to which goods are differentiated) or
the degree to which consumers value that differentiation. Even if we are unwilling to go as far as the
incomplete specialization framework suggested as an alternative here, these data should provoke
significant amendments so that the basic models conform to the included facts.

V.3 Coefficient estimates – consistency under the alternative hypothesis
The gravity equation is most commonly employed as a simple device for describing trade, and
identifying correlates. What do our results say about this basic enterprise? Recall that, under the
alternative hypothesis, multilateral trade and bilateral trade are mechanically linked through an adding up
constraint while variables such as national incomes merely operate as good proxies for multilateral trade.
That is, national incomes and capital/labor differences explain multilateral trade, not bilateral trade.
Because these variables may be noisy proxies for the true variable of interest, they are subject to the usual
errors in variables problem. Attenuation biases their coefficients toward zero, with the bias growing
worse as the proxies get noisier.
To show this property we alter the endowment data from our HO model so that the variable

kdifi = ki - k w , varies over countries i in a way that is uncorrelated with incomes Yi (i.e., on average,
large and small countries have endowments that are equally far from the world endowment). We re-solve
the model for output and multilateral trade levels in each of our 96 countries, and estimate the income
elasticity of multilateral trade in the manner of equation (9). With this setup, the estimated elasticity is
one, but the relationship between trade and income is noisy. The amount of noise is described by the
regression R2 from estimating equation (9). We repeat this exercise 50 times, varying kldif but holding
cov(kldif,Y)=0 so that the estimated multilateral income elasticity remains one. The R2’s for the 50 draws
are plotted on the horizontal axis in Figure 2.
Using the data generated from the HO model, we then distribute bilateral trade using the
minimum distance algorithm and estimate a bilateral gravity equation in the manner of equation (11).
The income coefficient from that regression is plotted on the vertical axis of Figure 2. This is done
separately for each of the 50 draws. With multiple draws we generate a relationship between how noisy
income is as a proxy for multilateral trade and the resulting bilateral income coefficients. Figure 2 shows
that a noisier relationship between multilateral trade and income result in a stronger downward bias on
gravity equation estimates, even though the mechanism for allocating bilateral trade remains constant.
We have focused on incomes for simplicity, but under the alternative hypothesis, the insights
apply more generally. It is easy to generate examples where variables such as per capita incomes,
capital/labor ratios, and MFN tariff levels only affect multilateral trade directly. However, they enter into
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bilateral regressions as proxies. As with the income example just shown, the noisier proxies will enter
with downward biased coefficients.

IV.4 Interpreting Regression Fit
Finally, much ado is made about the high R2s of gravity regressions.32 This can be thought of in
two ways. One, the included variables explain trade “well”. Two, the model is a useful baseline in the
sense that it controls for many things that matter so we need worry less about what is omitted.33 In this
section we examine the assertion that the gravity model “fits the data well” under the null and alternative
hypotheses.
The key to the analysis is a model-based approach to measuring regression fit in which we
calculate the ad-valorem equivalent of the residuals.34 Suppose that the null hypothesis of equation (6) is
exactly correct so that if we have a complete characterization of trade barriers, t, we will estimate the
model with no error. However, in practice we do not know t exactly, and variation in trade volumes due to
this omission shows up in the residuals. Interpreting the residuals as missing components of t, we
calculate from them the unexplained variation in trade barriers associated with unexplained variation in
trade volumes.35
More formally, represent tij in (6) as ln tij = δ0 ln DISTij + δ1LANGij + δ2 ADJ ij + lnτ ij
where distance, language, and adjacency are common correlates used in gravity regressions, and τij is the
ad-valorem equivalent of the unobserved barrier. This is estimated by

(15)

ln M ij = a + β1 ln YY
i j + D0 ln DISTij + D1LANGij + D2 ADJ ij + eij

Using equation (6) we note that the size of the barrier implied by the residual is τij = exp( − eij / σ ) while
the ad-valorem equivalent of the included variables can be similarly discerned ( δn = Dn / σ ). This

32

This sentiment is clear in several leading surveys of empirical evidence on international trade theory. Deardorff
(1984) writes that gravity models are “extremely successful empirically” as witnessed by the variance explained,
while Leamer and Levinsohn (1997) write that gravity models “have produced some of the clearest and most robust
empirical findings in economics.” McCallum’s (1995) famous piece on national borders justifies the use of the
gravity equation entirely by citing Deardorff’s quote.
33
Wei (1998), a well-known application that uses the gravity model to assess the effect of exchange rate variability
on trade, argues for using the gravity model on the grounds that it outperforms factor endowment models in an R2
sense, and that adding factor endowment terms to a gravity specification does little to improve fit.
34
This technique is closely related to a calculation done by Hummels (1999). See Leamer (1988) for a calculation
involving a factor endowments model that is similar in spirit.
35
Of course, for this to be exactly correct, the unobserved barriers must be uncorrelated with the included
regressors.
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interpretation of the residual underscores the limited content of traditional measures of regression fit
focused on unexplained variation in trade volumes. Suppose there are two states of the world, a high σ
state and a low σ state, and that trade patterns are identical in both cases. With identical trade patterns, a
regression R2 will yield the same measure of model fit in both states. However, in the high σ world, the
residuals correspond to relatively small unobserved trade barriers, i.e., whatever is left does not much
affect prices.
We estimate (15) using all (aggregate) bilateral trade flows reported in StatCan World Trade
Database in 1990. We estimate the constant and the income terms rather than directly imposing values
consistent with equation (6). This abstracts from concerns about the level of trade and allows us to focus
entirely on the bilateral distribution of trade.36 We also omit country pairs with zero trade values, as
implied trade barriers must be infinitely large to explain a zero trade in this model. Note that both of
these corrections make the residuals look much smaller than would be the case in an estimate strictly
guided by the underlying theory.

ln M ij = − 13.9 + .9ln YiY j − 1.03ln DISTij + .56 LANGij + .63 ADJ ij + eij
R 2 = .62 obs = 9083 RMSE = 2.2
All included variables are significant at the 1% level. For each i,j pair there is a unique residual
so we characterize the average unmeasured barrier as the root mean squared error of the regression. At
σ=5 (the preferred value from Section III.2) the RMSE is equivalent to a 55 percent tariff, while speaking
a different language raises costs by 11 percent, sharing a border lowers costs by 12 percent, and
increasing distance by one standard deviation above the mean (a 9 percent increase) increases costs by
(1.03/5)* 0.09=1.8 percent ad-valorem. The ad-valorem equivalent of the regression error is large both
absolutely and relative to the other barriers (more than twice as large as the combined effect of
traditionally included variables). Suppose we reject the literature’s estimate of σ and claim a much
higher value. This would lower the ad-valorem equivalent of the residual in absolute terms. However, it
would not change the importance of the residual relative to the included barriers, as all are proportional to
σ.
What do we conclude from this exercise? Under the null hypothesis of complete specialization
captured in equation (6), the interpretation is that we have identified a few variables that are robustly
correlated with trade volumes, but we simply have not done an adequate job of explaining barriers. Of
course, our barrier list is far from comprehensive and the model might fare much better with explicit
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measures of tariffs and transport costs (not to mention the relative price terms). But the simple form
estimated here is very common in the literature, and generally hailed as providing a good explanation of
the data. This interpretation is not sustainable, even under the null.
Under the alternative hypothesis of incomplete specialization, the interpretation is different. As
goods become perfect substitutes, importers concern themselves only with relative prices. In this case,
minute changes in trade barriers may generate enormous changes in bilateral trade volumes as importers
shift to the low cost supplier.

The implication is that the “missing barriers” captured by the residual, as

well as the included barriers (distance, language, adjacency) may be quite small. To put this in the
language of the null model, let σ go to infinity and evaluate the ad-valorem equivalents of

τij = exp(− eij / σ ) and δn = Dn / σ .
Even if we are only concerned with a positive description of bilateral trade flows, this implication
is troubling. The interpretation under the alternative hypothesis suggests a considerable role for “noise”
that may not yield to economic analysis, as small and difficult to measure price changes may swamp other
effects.

VI. Conclusions
There are three main contributions. First, we demonstrate that the gravity equation as a statistical
relationship (and not as a specific prediction about bilateral trade) can be generated from a model with
incomplete specialization. Second, we analyze two facts or “puzzles” that are broadly inconsistent with
the complete specialization models typically used to derive the gravity equation. In both cases, the data
are consistent with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete specialization. “Home bias”, for example, is
only puzzling when viewed through the lens of the complete specialization model. Third, we demonstrate
that the explanation for why the gravity equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity
equation is interpreted and used, and how we view bilateral trade.

36

We have already shown in Section III.2 that the level of actual trade is much lower than is predicted by the
complete specialization model.
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Appendix A – Simulation Methodology
In the text, multilateral trade flows are generated in a 2x2xn numerical Heckscher-Ohlin model. The
solution technique for this model is discussed in this appendix.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology for the two goods,

Z1 = K α L1− α
Z 2 = K 1− α Lα
and experiment with the parameters, varying α from 0.55 to 0.95. Preferences are also Cobb-Douglas, with equal
expenditure shares on each good. Using our assumptions on taste and technology, and using data on endowments,
we solve for the output and multilateral volume of trade in both goods for each country.
In order to determine the output of each good in each country, we need to determine the relative factor use
for each good. For countries outside of the cone of diversification, this is trivial. For countries inside the cone of
diversification, factor intensities are determined from the following two equations:

PZ 1MPLZ 1 = PZ 2 MPLZ 2
PZ 1MPK Z 1 = PZ 2 MPK Z 2
or more precisely, denoting f(k/l) , g(k/l) as the production functions for goods one and two,

 PZ 1   LZ 1 

 f '
−
 PZ 2   K Z 1 
 PZ 1   LZ 1 

 f 
−
 PZ 2   K Z 1 

L 
g ' Z 2  = 0
 KZ 2 
 LZ 1 

f
 K Z1 

 L    L   L   L 
'  Z 1  − g  Z 2 −  Z 2 g '  Z 2  = 0
 K Z 1    K Z 2   K Z 2   K Z 2 

These are two equations in three variables,

LZ 1 LZ 2 PZ 1
,
,
.
K Z 1 KZ 2 PZ 1

Discovering the equilibrium values of all three variables is then a matter of searching over prices for that
corresponding to factor intensities resulting in balanced world trade. The algorithm that determines equilibrium
prices is one that searches over prices for those that equalize world imports and exports of both goods. The
algorithm proceeds as follows. First, pick some relative prices of the final goods, the ratio of the world capital
supply to the world labor supply is generally used here. For a given price ratio, the equations above uniquely
determine the borders of the cone of diversification, the labor-capital ratios used in the production of the two goods
by countries that do not specialize. Within the cone of diversification, the supply of labor and capital to each
industry can determined from full employment conditions on the factor endowments, and noting that the factor
usage will be identical to the factor usage that define the cone. If trade does not balance for the chosen price vector,
the relative price of the good in excess demand rises, and the algorithm is repeated until trade is balanced.
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Figure 1 – “Variety” in Trade
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Figure 2: Attenuation Bias under Alternative Hypothesis
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Table 1
Elasticity of Multilateral Trade with Respect to Income
HO Simulation
Income

0.81
(.04)

KLDIF

R2
N

0.96
(.03)

Real data
0.92
(.03)

1.05
(.09)
0.83
96

0.92
96

0.93
96

Table 2
Gravity Equation Estimates
HO Simulation
ln Yi Yj

0.57
(.03)

0.66
(.03)

kldif(i)

0.59
(.11)

kldif(j)

0.59
(.11)

R2
N

0.62
190

0.69
190

Real data
0.9
(.01)

0.61
(.03)

0.51
8359

0.48
189105

Table 3
The Level of Trade

Country

M= Relative
purchases

Australia
Austria
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US

4.37
2.77
2.30
1.60
3.54
3.27
2.36
6.47
16.60
4.43
1.37
3.67
1.49
3.27
5.14
3.22
1.94
2.79
5.01

S= Relative
size
0.013
0.008
0.025
0.006
0.005
0.063
0.089
0.058
0.202
0.015
0.015
0.002
0.005
0.004
0.026
0.011
0.012
0.050
0.370

Ratio of external to
internal prices
σ=1
σ=5
334.0
328.8
90.7
255.3
771.4
51.8
26.6
111.9
82.1
298.5
93.0
2037.1
298.9
847.2
194.3
293.0
168.7
56.2
13.6

3.20
3.19
2.46
3.03
3.78
2.20
1.93
2.57
2.41
3.13
2.48
4.59
3.13
3.85
2.87
3.11
2.79
2.24
1.68

